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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS - 1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL J. HARTMAN*
Nature and Formation of Partnerships: The question whether a con-
tract sued on was a partnership arrangement so as to be cognizable only
in equity was considered by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Powel
v. Bundy.' There Bundy, a real estate broker, sued Powell on the law
side to recover $500, alleged to be plaintiff's one-half share of a com-
mission earned by their joint efforts in selling a tract of real estate,
but which commission had been collected and wrongfully retained by
defendant. Among other defenses interposed was defendant's conten-
tion that the contract sued on was that of a partnership arrangement
between the parties and that one partner cannot sue another partner
at law, exclusive jurisdiction of such a suit being in a court of equity.2
Although the question of jurisdiction may not have been squarely
before the court,3 nevertheless the court concluded that the contract
was not one of partnership but was a mere agreement of the parties
to work together and divide the commissions. The court held that the
suit was properly brought on the law side and affirmed a lower court
judgment for the plaintiff.
The question whether a business association or arrangement consti-
tutes a partnership may, of course, be important for several reasons.
4
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 272 S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
2. See Davis v. Fisher, 27 Tenn. App. 663, 669, 184 S.W.2d 400 (M.S. 1944);
GIBSON, SuITs n CHANCERY § 960 (4th ed. 1937). In this connection see the
limitations on this doctrine as pointed out in note 3, infra.
3. The court points out in its opinion that there was no demurrer by the
defendant challenging the jurisdiction of the court. A Tennessee statute pro-
vides that any suit of an equitable nature, brought in the circuit court, where
objection has not been taken by demurrer to the jurisdiction, may be trans-
ferred to the chancery court of the county, or be heard and determined by
the circuit court upon the principles of a court of equity. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 10329 (Williams 1934), Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn.
421, 424, 70 S.W.2d 361 (1934).
4. A great number of cases in which the issue of partnership existence is
raised, of course, concern a creditor of the business, seeking to impose a per-
sonal liability upon an associate. Mosley v. Orr & Co., 6 Tenn. App. 243 (M.S.
1927); Schleicker v. Krier, 218 Wis. 376, 261 N.W. 413 (1935). In a suit for
dissolution of the alleged partnership we find another run-of-the-mill reason
for deciding whether a partnership exists. Moore v. Du Bard, 318 Mich. 578,
29 N.W.2d 94 (1947). With or without asking for a dissolution of the partner-
ship, a suit may have to do with a partner's right to an accounting as to
partnership affairs. Davis v. Fisher, 27 Tenn. App. 663, 184 S.W.2d 400 (M.S.
1944). The question whether a particular business arrangement is a partner-
ship may come up in certain criminal matters, as where the "owner" of a
retail beer business is required to have a license and permit to sell beer,
the defendant saying he is merely an "employee" and not a partner. Stewart v.
State, 190 Tenn. 334, 229 S.W.2d 504 (1950). A right to workmen's compensa-
tion may turn on whether claimant is treated as an "employee" or a partner.
Thurston v. Detroit Asphalt & Paving Co., 226 Mich. 505, 198 N.W. 345 (1924).
By the same token a right to unemployment compensation may hinge on
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In the case at hand it was important under the doctrine in Tennessee
that one partner can sue another partner only on the equity side.5 Nor
is it always an easy matter to determine whether the business arrange-
ment does satisfy the requisites of a partnership.
Just what is a partnership? Subject to the doctrine that a partner-
ship may result by reason of estoppel,6 persons who are not partners
as to each other are not partners as to third persons.7 Partnership
by estoppel has no application as between alleged partners,8 and, of
course, that doctrine finds no place in the case at hand since the con-
troversy is between members of the association. In determining
whether persons are partners as to each other there are certain rules,
now crystalized into statutory form, which are helpful for determining
the existence of a partnership. As defined by Section 6 of the Uniform
Partnership Act,9 adopted in Tennessee,' 0 "[a] partnership is an as-
sociation of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit." The two principal -elements embodied in this definition
are (1) sharing in the profits of a business carried on by two or more
whether claimant will be treated as a partner. In re Zeits, 108 Ind. App. 617, 31
N.E.2d 209 (1941). As between partners their dealings in real estate may be
treated as personal property. Tutt v. Davis, 13 Cal. App. 715, 110 Pac. 690
(1910). Thus, as between partners, for purposes of inheritance realty may
be treated as personalty. Cultra v. Cultra, 188 Tenn. 506, 221 S.W.2d 533
(1949). For purposes of the Statute of Frauds real estate dealings between
partners may be treated as personal property dealings. Smith v. Guy, 24 Tenn.
App. 352, 144 S.W.2d 702 (E.S. 1940), 16 TENN. L. REv. 885 (1941). In the liqui-
dation of a business arrangement, the priority of creditors will, in part, depend
upon whether the business is a partnership. 'When partnership property and
the individual properties of the partners are in the possession of a court for
distribution, partnership creditors shall have priority on partnership property,
and separate creditors on individual property .... " UNIFORV PARTNERSmp
AcT § 40 (h); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7879 (h) (Williams 1934). Another instance
where the question of the existence of a partnership may arise is in con-
nection with joinder of parties in a suit against an alleged partnership. In
a contract action against a partnership, the liability of a partner ordinarily
is joint only. UNzFomv PARTNERSmp ACT § 15 (b). Under this rule all part-
ners should be joined as defendants. CArNE, PARTNERSIP 308-09 (2d ed. 1952).
This rule has now been changed by statute in Tennessee so that all partners are
both jointly and severally liable on contract actions. TENN. CODE Sup,. § 7854
(1950).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. UNIFORMV PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(4), TENN. CODE ANN. § 7846 (Williams
1934); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 16, TENN. CODE ANN. § 7855 (Williams
1934), Mosley v. Orr. & Co., 6 Tenn. App. 243 (M.S. 1927).
7. UNIFORMVI PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 (4).
8. Badger v. Boyd, 16 Tenn. App. 629, 65 S.W.2d 601 (M.S. 1933). However,
where father and two sons entered into purported partnership agreement
providing for sharing of profits, sons who acted for period of years on under-
standing that they were chargeable with share of losses were estopped after
father's death from obtaining from father's estate reimbursement for losses,
where sons claimed that agreement did not create a partnership. In re
Kennedy's Estate, 321 Pa. 225, 183 Atl. 798 (1936).
9. UNIFoRMu PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6.
10. The Uniform Partnership Act is found in TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED
§§ 7841-82 (Williams 1934). Section 6 of the act is found in § 7845 of the
Tennessee Code. Thirty-four states, plus Alaska, have now adopted the Uni-
form Partnership Act. See 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 6 (Supp. 1954).
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persons; and (2) co-owners of the business. Profit-sharing may make
out a prima facie partnership. Thus, under Section 7 (4) of the Uniform
Partnership Act,' the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of
a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business.
But this same section of the act further provides that no such inference
shall be drawn if such profits were received as payment in certain
specified transactions, namely:
(a) as payment of a debt by installments or otherwise;
(b) as wages of an employee, or rent to a landlord;
(c) as an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) as interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the
profits of the business;
(e) as the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or
other property by installments or otherwise.
These five exceptions of Section 7 of the Uniform Partnership Act12
to a prima facie inference of partnership, resulting from profit-sharing,
deal with various transactions which resemble partnerships as to profit-
sharing but do not satisfy the fundamental condition of carrying on
business as co-owners or the policy of imposing partnership liability.
13
Section 7 (3) of the Uniform Partnership Act 14 deals with sharing of
gross returns, as distinguished from sharing profits, and seems par-
ticularly applicable to the case at hand. Under this section of the
act the sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partner-
ship, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common
right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived.15
11. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(4); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7846 (Williams
1934).
12. Ibid.
13. The line separating a partnership from an association that is not such
is often blurred. Co-ownership and development of oil and mining property is
a type of enterprise which has given trouble and has been variously classified
by the courts. Several cases have held that, lacking evidence of specific intent
to become partners, the development of mining property does not change the
relationship from that of co-ownership into that of partnership. Transconti-
nental Oil Co. v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 29 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1928); Cecil
v. Montgomery, 95 Okla. 184, 218 Pac. 311 (1923); Butler Savings Bank v.
Osborne, 159 Pa. 10, 28 Atl. 163 (1893). Likewise, the joint dealing in
property acquired for resale has been variously classified by the courts. It has
been held that, lacking specific intent to become partners, no partnership
is created if property is acquired for joint resale. Clark v. Sidway, 142 U.S. 682
(1892); Magee v. Magee, 233 Mass. 341, 123 N.E. 673 (1919). See, also, Jenkins
v. Harris, 19 Tenn. App. 113, 83 S.W.2d 562 (M.S. 1935). However, a partner-
ship has been found to exist where the parties agreed to engage in one or
more particular transactions for purchase and sale of real estate for profit.
Harmon v. Martin, 395 Ill. 595, 71 N.E.2d 74 (1947). For a more complete dis-
cussion of these problems see CRANE, PARTNERSmP 52-55 (2d ed. 1952).
14. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(3); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7846 (Williams
1934).
15. The fact that parties were co-owners of business and shared gross re-
turns therefrom will not, of itself, establish a partnership. In re Zeits, 108
Ind. App. 617, 31 N.E.2d 209 (1941); Benton v. White, 185 Ga. 286, 194 SE.
179 (1937); Moore v. Du Bard, 318 Mich. 578, 29 N.W.2d 94 (1947); Schleicker
v. Krier, 218 Wis. 376, 261 N.W. 413 (1935).
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In Powell v. Bundy, the instant case, about the most favorable finding
that the jury could have made from the pertinent, conflicting evidence
bearing on the existence of a partnership was that defendant had an
office and plaintiff had an automobile. Defendant furnished his office
and plaintiff his automobile; and the two of them occasionally worked
together in selling property and dividing the commission. They so
handled the transaction involved in the present case. Defendant al-
legedly collected the commission of $500 and refused to pay over
plaintiff's half of it.
It can thus readily be seen that about the most pertinent evidence
of the existence of a partnership in the case at hand is the sharing of
gross returns by plaintiff and defendant; and the Tennessee statute ex-
pressly provides that the sharing of gross returns does not of itself
establish a partnership. 16 The burden is on the one asserting the
existence of a partnership to prove it by competent evidence. 17 Defend-
ant did not carry that burden.
There may or may not have been present in the case at hand the
other requisite of a partnership, which is co-ownership of the business.
Insofar as the court's opinion discloses, the party claiming the existence
of the partnership did not make co-ownership clear. The burden of
establishing the partnership relationship was thus not discharged in
this respect.18 Co-ownership of the business by the associates conduct-
ing it is taken by the Uniform Partnership Act as a fundamental char-
acteristic of a partnership along with the sharing of profits.19 But
co-ownership does not necessarily mean that the property so used must
belong to the partners in common.20 The property thus used may be-
long to one or more partners, so that there is no joint property other
than in earnings. 21 Co-ownership of a business, in essence, means the
proprietary right of sharing in the surplus and profits and perhaps to
some extent, in the control of the business, at least in having a possible
power of ultimate control as to changes of the contract under which
they operate.
2 2
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7846 (Williams 1934).
17. Cunningham v. Winteroth, 348 Ill. 391, 181 N.E. 340 (1932); Smith v.
Maine, 145 Misc. 521, 260 N.Y. Supp. 409 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Badger v. Boyd,
16 Tenn. App. 629, 65 S.W.2d 601 (M.S. 1933).
18. See textual material supported by cases in note 17 supra.
19. See Commissioner's notes, UNIFORm PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6.
20. Co-ownership of the business, as distinguished from co-ownership of the
assets, is the important thing. Toner v. Sobelman, 86 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa.
1949). Also, in a partnership association, it is competent for one person to
contribute services, while another contributes money or property. Cf. Ruta v.
Werner, 1 N.J. Super. 455, 63 A.2d 825 (1948); Sheldon v. Little, 111 Vt. 301,
15 A.2d 574 (1940); see Eppes v. Eppes, 169 Va. 778, 195 S.E. 694 (1938).
21. Brown v. Fairbanks, 121 Cal. App.2d 432, 263 P.2d 355 (1953); Thurston
v. Detroit Asphalt & Paving Co., 226 Mich. 505, 198 N.W. 345 (1924); cf.
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Pope, 178 Tenn. 580, 161 S.W.2d 211, aff'd, 315
U.S. 649 (1942).
22. The element of control is one that is now given much emphasis. See
CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 62-63 (2d ed. 1952). "To state that partners are co-
1955 ]
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The court thus seems justified in concluding that the agreement sued
on was not a partnership contract so as to be cognizable only in equity.
Some question can be raised, however, concerning one line of au-
thority on which the court relies. The court cited the Hackney Co.
case and the Stewart case 23 for the proposition that "sharing of profits
of a business as compensation for personal services does not constitute
a partnership. '24 That proposition is entirely too broad for the ra-
tionale of those cases. Both cases dealt with specific exceptions where
the Uniform Partnership Act expressly provides that the sharing of
profits does not give rise to an inference that the business arrangement
was a partnership. Both cases construed the exception which says
that no inference as to the existence of a partnership shall be drawn
if the profits were received "as wages of an employee or rent to a
landlord." Pretty clearly this specific exception of the act does not
warrant the court's broad conclusion that "sharing of profits of a
business as compensation for personal services does not constitute a
partnership," for the act expressly provides that, subject to certain
named exceptions, "the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of
a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the bus-
iness."2
6
Nature of Partner's Interest in Partnership Property-For Purpose
of Claims Against His Interest: United States v. Worley27 is the con-
solidation of a bankruptcy case and a case to enforce a tax lien of the
federal government, in which the federal court of appeals was con-
cerned with the nature of partnership property. More specifically, the
court was concerned with whether an assignment by an individual
partner of his partnership interest was valid, and also with whether
a federal tax lien would attach to the partnership property for the
individual taxes of the partner. It was necessary for the court to
decide between the priority of these claims, on the one hand, and
the claim of a trustee in bankruptcy on the other hand. Although the
partnership in question later was organized into a corporation, which
is the bankrupt in the case at hand, nevertheless while it was still
a partnership one of the partners made a separation agreement with
his wife in which he executed what the court treated as an assign-
ment of one-half of the individual partner's drawing account, one-half
owners of a business is to state that they have the power of ultimate control."
Notes of Commissioners, UNIFORM PARTNERsHip ACT § 7. In addition, see cases
cited notes 20, 21 supra.
23. Hackney Co. v. Robert E. Lee Hotel, 156 Tenn. 243, 300 S.W. 1 (1927);
Stewart v. State, 190 Tenn. 334, 229 S.W.2d 504 (1950).
24. Powell v. Bundy, 272 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
25. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 (4) (b).
26. Note 24 supra.
27. 213 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1954). There was also a point concerning the
suability of the federal government. That point is not covered in the present
discussion of the case.
[ VOL. 8
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
of his profits and one-half his capital interest in the event of dissolution
of the partnership. The wife's was one of the claims whose priority
was asserted over the trustee in bankruptcy claiming the assets as a
representative of creditors. While the organization was still a partner-
ship the same partner incurred some individual tax liabilities to the
federal government for which it asserted a tax lien in one of the con-
solidated cases in the matter at hand. The Government, too, claimed a
priority over the trustee. A mortgage on partnership real estate in
question was executed by the partnership, but the purported as-
signment and the tax claim both arose before the date of the mortgage.
The trustee in bankruptcy conceded the priority of this mortgage
claim. The trustee, however, claimed all proceeds from the sale of
the realty over and above the mortgage in his capacity as representa-
tive of creditors.
The court held that, because of the nature of partnership property,
there could be no valid assignment by the individual partner to his
wife. And it further held that, because of the nature of partnership
property, there could be no valid tax lien on partnership property for
taxes owed by the individual partner. The decree awarded all the
proceeds of the sale, after the payment of the mortgage, to the trustee
for payment of debts of the bankrupt.
While a trustee in bankruptcy takes title to the property of a bank-
rupt debtor so he can pay the bankrupt's debts,2 nevertheless his title
may be subject to valid assignments made by the debtor,29 or valid liens
against the property.30 " So the pivotal points in the case at hand re-
volve around the questions whether the purported assignment by an
individual partner of partnership property takes priority over the
claim of a trustee in bankruptcy and whether the Government's tax
claim for taxes owed by the individual partner is entitled to priority
over the trustee. To keep these points in clear perspective, we should
not lose sight of the fact that the successor business organization to the
partnership is a corporation which is in bankruptcy and was organized
by the partners to take over the partnership property and business.
The court's opinion does not make it clear, however, whether the
partnership was insolvent at the time it sold out to the corporation.
In dealing with attempted assignments by individual partners of
their respective rights as co-owners, there arises the question as to
what power the partner has to make dispositions of his share of speci-
fic partnership property. The Uniform Partnership Act,31 adopted in
28. Bankruptcy Act § 70, 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (1953).
29. In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946).
30. Only judicial liens obtained-within four months before the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy can be annulled. Bankruptcy Act § 67, 30 STAT. 564
(1898), 11U.S.C.A. § 107 (a) (2) (1953).
31. At common law, prior to the Uniform Partnership Act, a partner's share
was assignable, but the assignee took subject to the equitable right of co-
19551
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Tennessee, 2 provides that a partner's right in specific property is not
assignable except in connection with the assignment of rights of all
partners in the same property.33 All that the assignee is entitled to
receive, under the Uniform Partnership Act, is the assigning partner's
share in profits.3 4 Hence, because of the very nature of the partner's
separate interest in partnership property, a purported assignment of
partnership property by an individual partner does not affect the
partnership ownership in the property and its availability for partner-
ship creditors.3
5
Nor is a partner's right in specific partnership property subject to
attachment or execution, except upon a claim against the partner-
ship.36 As a remedy for the separate creditor of the partner, however,
the Uniform Partnership Act provides a charging order to reach the
interest of the debtor partner in the partnership. 37 The charging order
is intended to take the place of attachment by the separate creditor, the
attachment not being permitted under the act.38 Moreover, we must
not forget that a partner's interest in the partnership is only his share
of the profits and surplus after all partnership debts have been paid.30
Since a partner's interest is only his share of the surplus after part-
nership debts are paid, that surplus alone is liable for separate debts of
each partner.40 Thus, if there are no profits, there would seem to be
nothing that the creditor can reach, just as the purported assignee
could reach nothing but the profits, if any, to which the assigning
partner would otherwise be entitled.41 Partnership creditors must first
be satisfied out of partnership assets before there would be any dis-
partners to have the property applied to partnership purposes. CRANE, PARTNER-
SHIP § 42 (2d ed. 1952).
32. TENx. CODE ANN. §§ 7841-82 (Williams 1934).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7864 (2) (b) (Williams 1934); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 25 (2) (b).
34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7866 (1) (Williams 1934); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
7 U.L.A. § 27(1).
35. The Commissioners' Note to section 25 of the Uniform Partnership Act
purports to tell us why the individual partner cannot make an assignment of
specific property. If the law were to recognize the possibility of such a trans-
fer of specific partnership property by an assignment, the assignee would pro
tanto become a partner in the partnership, for the rights of the assignee would
be to possess the chattel for a partnership purpose, the same as the assigning
partner. A partnership is a voluntary relation and the non-assigning partners
cannot have a partner thrust upon them without their consent. Mr. Crane
also points out that while the earlier cases protecting the partnership from
the separate creditors were based on the non-debtor partners' equities in the
partnership property, many later decisions have expressed the theory that the
ownership of specific partnership property is in the partnership as a distinct
legal person. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 207 (2d ed. 1952).
36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7864(2) (c) (Williams 1934); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 25 (2) (c).
37. TENN. CODE AN. § 7867 (Williams 1934); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 28.
38. See CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 213 (2d ed. 1952).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7865 (Williams 1934); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 26.
40. Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1948).
41. Authorities cited note 8 supra.
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tributable surplus to the individual partner to which the Government
could look for the satisfaction of the individual tax liability of the
partner, or to which the assignee could look for the satisfaction of
his claim.4 2
So, in the case at hand, so long as the business organization re-
mained a partnership (before it became a corporation) it would seem
that there was nothing to which the purported assignment could attach,
if there was no profits to which the assigning partner was entitled. By
the same token, it is difficult to see how the federal government could
acquire a tax lien under its statute which provides for a lien in favor
of the United States upon property belonging to the taxpayer, if there
were no profits to which the tax defaulting partner was entitled.
43
The opinion does not make it clear whether such profits were available
when the partnership was reorganized into a corporation. If profits to
which the partner was entitled existed, there apparently would have
been nothing to prevent both the assignee 44 and the Government 45 from
realizing their claims, had they taken timely and appropriate steps
before the partnership assets were all spent by the successor corpora-
tion which, at some stage of the game, became bankrupt.
Winding Up of Insolvent Partnership-Distribution of Assets: Smith
v. Shetter46 was a suit to wind up an insolvent two-man partnership.
The issue in the case concerned the distribution of the partnership
property where the facts as found showed that one member of the
partnership had contributed $1,279.75 more to the partnership than the
other partner. In modifying the chancellor's decree, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals held that the partner who contributed the larger
amount by $1,279.75 was entitled to recover one-half that amount from
the other partner. The court adjudged one-half the costs against each
of the partners.
The distribution of partnership assets in the process of winding up
of a dissolved partnership requires, first of all, the payment of creditors
other than partners.47 After that come the claims of partners other
than those for repayment of capital contributions or profits, such as
claims for advancements made by partners.48 Then partners are en-
42. See Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1948).
43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 6321.
44. In case of dissolution of the partnership, an assignee is entitled to re-
ceive his assignor's interest and may require an accounting. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 7866(2) (Williams 1934); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 27(2). The transfer
of partnership property to the corporation was a dissolution.
45. See Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674. 678-79 (10th Cir. 1948).
46. 277 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
47. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18(a), 40; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7857, 7879
(Willihms 1934).
48. Ibid. Partnership assets are, before any distribution to individual part-
ners, subject to reimbursement of one partner for advances made by him to the
firm's capital, in behalf of the other partners, beyond the amount for which
he may be obligated. Valley Springs Holding Corp. v. Carlson, 56 S.D. 163,
227 N.W. 841 (1929).
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titled to the return of their respective capital contributions, 49 If there
is not sufficient partnership property to repay capital contributions, the
loss is to be shared by the solvent partners, like other losses, in the pro-
portions in which they would share profits.50 Finally, if there remains
any balance of partnership property it is distributable as profits.51 Of
course, the partners, as between themselves, have a right to make such
disposition of the partnership property as they deem fit, if no rights of
creditors are involved.52
In the case at hand the partnership was insolvent and the pivotal
point was the share of capital contributions where one partner paid in
more than the other partner. In awarding the partner a recovery
against the other partner of one-half the extra amount he had con-
tributed in the case at hand, the case seems to represent no departure
from the rules for determining the rights of the partners.
Winding Up of Solvent Domestic Corporation-ex rel. Proceedings:
State ex rel. v. Breedlove53 had to do with the problem of liquidating
a domestic private corporation. The record showed that the corpora-
tion was organized for a purpose the court treated as illegal (Naturo-
pathy) ; that the defendant officers had conveyed to themselves almost
all of the assets of the corporation, much of which were transferred
without consideration and fraudulently; and that the corporation had
ceased to be a going concern and was in the process of liquidation. The
suit was filed in the name of the State of Tennessee by the District
Attorney General on relation of five preferred stockholders. The bill
of complaint asked: (1) for an injunction to prohibit the sale of the
property; (2) for an accounting; (3) for a liquidation of the corpora-
tion; (4) for the recission of the conveyances of the real estate to the
defendant officers; and (5) for the sale of all property for the benefit of
those entitled to the proceeds. By way of defense the defendants took
several positions: (a) that the preferred stockholders could not main-
tain a bill to wind up a corporation, (b) that the bill could not be
maintained because the corporation was not insolvent, and (c) that
the court was without jurisdiction. The Tennessee Court of Appeals
overruled all the objections and granted relief.
It has frequently been declared as a general proposition that unless
49. The Uniform Partnership Act expressly provides that the rights and
duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, sub-
ject to any agreement between them, by the following rules: "Each partner
shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of capital or advances to
the partnership property ... ." UNIFORM PARTNERSHP ACT § 18(a); TENN.
CODE AmN. § 7857 (Williams 1934). See also UNIFORM PARTNERSIaP ACT § 40;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7879 (Williams 1934).
50. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18(a), 40, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7857, 7879
(Williams 1934).
51. Ibid.
52. Stroh v. Dumas, 117 Vt. 13, 84 A.2d 408 (1951).
53. 270 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
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jurisdiction is conferred by statute, courts of equity have no authority
to decree the winding up of a solvent corporation, or to appoint a
receiver to distribute its assets and liquidate its affairs at the suit of
a minority shareholder.54 It is now becoming widely recognized, how-
ever, that there are circumstances under which a court of equity, in the
absence of other adequate remedy, will afford relief to shareholders
against fraud and gross mismanagement by an appointment of a re-
ceiver and the winding up of even a solvent corporation. 55 Also, where
a corporation has ceased to function, or has become insolvent, or where
it is impossible to attain the objects for which it was formed, a stock-
holder may wind up the corporation.56 The court does not make it
clear whether the corporation was insolvent, but that would not seem
to be crucial here. The practical consequences of winding up or liqui-
dation in equity will be to put an end to the business life of the corpora-
tion, although it does not ipso facto terminate its legal existence or
cause a dissolution.
57
In the case at hand we have an ex rel. proceeding in the name of the
state, but really for the benefit of the shareholders. The Tennessee law
does provide that a suit can be brought in the name of the state against
corporations and their officers for various reasons, including the exer-
cise of powers not conferred by law.58 The corporation in the instant
case was engaged in the practice of Naturopathy which the court held
to be prohibited by statute, thus making the purpose for which the
corporation was formed illegal.
Although there appears to be reason and authority for the ex rel.
proceeding, it seems that the bulk of the relief granted was more akin
to that granted in a suit for the benefit of the stockholders than in
the ordinary ex rel. proceeding.
54. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 304, pp. 714-15 (1946); 16 FLETCHER, COR-
PORATIONS § 8080 (1942).
55. Ibid.
56. Orman v. Bransford Realty Co., 168 Tenn. 70, 73 S.W.2d 713 (1934).
57. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 304, p. 715 (1946). See Notes, 91 A.L.R.
682 (1934), 61 A.L.R. 1212 (1929), 43 A.L.R. 309-11 (1926).
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9336 (Williams 1934).
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